Governmental Services and Social Welfare by Frederick, Mary Elizabeth
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 30 
Issue 4 Summer 1981 Article 20 
1981 
Governmental Services and Social Welfare 
Mary Elizabeth Frederick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Mary E. Frederick, Governmental Services and Social Welfare, 30 Cath. U. L. Rev. 762 (1981). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/20 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For 





In a case of first impression, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held, in In re JM. W,' that family division courts lacked jurisdiction to
revoke the aftercare status of a minor once the minor is placed in the cus-
tody of the Commission on Social Services.2 A delinquent juvenile was
placed by court order in the care of the Commission and granted aftercare
status by the Commission. Then, after the juvenile had twice violated cur-
few, the District of Columbia Corporation Counsel successfully petitioned
the family court to revoke the aftercare status. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals found that, as a matter of statutory construction,3 the
commitment of a minor to the care of a social service agency, unlike pro-
bation, was a dispositional alternative that could not subsequently be mod-
ified by the family court. According to the appeals court, the family court
retained the power to modify a Commission aftercare decision only if the
original court order granting custody to the Commission (or other social
service agency) specifies that release of the child must be court-ordered.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in In re TLJ ,4 found that
the District of Columbia Corporation Counsel had standing to move to
extend the commitment of a juvenile where the extension was necessary
for the juvenile's welfare or for protection of the public interest. The de-
fendant, convicted and placed in the custody of the Commission on Social
Services to be released only upon court order, challenged the Corporation
Counsel's standing. The defendant argued that District of Columbia law
permitted the extension of juvenile disposition orders only upon motion of
the institution holding the juvenile in custody, or upon a court finding that
such an extension would benefit the minor or would be in the public inter-
1. 411 A.2d 345 (D.C. 1980).
2. Id at 346. Aftercare status means that the juvenile either is returned to his home
with follow-up counseling for the juvenile and his family, or is placed in a supervised group
house. The Commission on Social Services was previously known as the Social Rehabilita-
tion Agency.
3. The court construed D.C. CODE §§ 16-2301(21) & 16-2322(a) (1973).
4. 413 A.2d 154 (D.C. 1980).
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est.' The court of appeals rejected the defendant's contentions. It held
that the authority granted custodial institutions was not exclusive in light
of the broad statutory authority of the District of Columbia to participate
in all family division proceedings, and in light of the Corporation Coun-
sel's authority to act on behalf of the Commission on Social Services in all
matters.6
B. Mental Health
Refusing to follow its earlier decisions, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals held, in In re Nelson,' that the proper standard of proof in civil
commitment proceedings was clear and convincing evidence, not proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt. While denying the defendant's claim that there
was insufficient evidence to find that she was incompetent beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the court expressly adopted the clear and convincing stan-
dard recently enunciated by the Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas.'
The court of appeals noted that its previous decisions, which adhered to a
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, expressed the belief that the poten-
tial deprivations of liberty embodied by civil commitment and by criminal
proceedings were comparable.9 Adopting the reasoning of Addington, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected this belief. The court
stated that, unlike a criminal proceeding, civil commitment was not an
adversarial process, and that hospitalization, unlike a penal sentence, was
based on the government's beneficial parenspatriae power.
5. D.C. CODE § 16-2322(b)(2) (1973).
6. D.C. CODE § 16-2305() (1973).
7. 408 A.2d 1233 (D.C. 1979).
8. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
9. The issue of standard of proof for civil commitment proceedings was squarely ad-
dressed in In re Hodges, 325 A.2d 605 (D.C. 1974). In that case, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of In re Bally, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and
concluded that the proper balance between individual liberty and the legitimate interests of
the state in institutionalization could only be struck by a standard requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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Under the District of Columbia Newborn Screening Act," all District of
Columbia hospitals must now test newborn infants for hyperthyroidism
and phenylketonuria, which are metabolic disorders that can result in
mental retardation. The Act requires that parents be fully informed of the
purpose and the risks of such testing, and that no tests shall be adminis-
tered over parental objection. The Act also provides that positive test re-
sults are to be returned to the parents and that the District designate a
physician to assist the parents in arranging follow-up examinations or
therapy.
The Act also directs the Mayor to appoint a Committee on Metabolic
Disorders, comprised of four consumers and five nonconsumers. Four of
the latter must be physicians knowledgeable in metabolic disorders. The
Committee's duties include informing the public about metabolic disorders
and available programs, evaluating the efficacy of the new early detection
program, and submitting annual reports of its activities to the Mayor. The
Mayor retains the authority to order, through regulations, additional test-
ing.
2 Certificate of Need
The District of Columbia Council enacted the District of Columbia Cer-
tificate of Need Act of 1980,2 repealing a similar 1977 act and continuing
the District's qualification for federal assistance under the National Health
Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974."3 The new Certificate
10. The District of Columbia Council also passed the following: Public Service
Commission General Counsel Act of 1980, D.C. Law No. 3-124, 28 D.C. R. Reg. 90, 970
(1981) (to be codified in D.C. CODE § 43-204) (establishes an Office of General Counsel for
the Commission and grants the General Counsel authority to represent and appear for the
Commission in all actions); District of Columbia Office of Energy Act of 1980, D.C. Law
No. 3-132, 28 D.C. R. Reg. 445, 1168 (1981) (to be codified in D.C. CODE tit. 1, ch. 19)
(transforms the District of-Columbia Energy Unit of the Mayor's Executive Office into a
separate executive office charged with the development of a comprehensive long-range
energy plan and a fuel allocation program, and promotion of energy-related business and
low income assistance policies. The Act also establishes a 21 member Citizen's Energy
Advisory Committee).
11. D.C. Law No. 3-89, 27 D.C. R. Reg. 1087, 3389 (1980) (to be codified in D.C. CODE
§ 6-2231.
12. D.C. Law No. 3-99, 27 D.C. R. Reg. 3599, 4268 (1980) (to be codified in D.C. CODE
32-341 to -357).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k to 300n-5 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The National Health Planning
[Vol. 30:762
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of Need Act narrows the circumstances in which a certificate is required.
Only persons proposing new inpatient institutionalized health services, ac-
quisition of major medical equipment, or investments of over $150,000 in
capital expenditures need apply to the District of Columbia Department of
Human Resources. The Department will determine whether the public
need warrants such change in health services.
To qualify for a certificate of need, an applicant's proposal must meet all
appropriate federal statutory or regulatory requirements and the applicant
must pledge that a reasonable volume of its services (up to 3% of its total
operating expenses) will be provided without charge or at reduced rates.
The District of Columbia Department of Human Resources shall specify
in each certificate the maximum amount of capital expenditures that may
be obligated by each applicant. Certificates are for one year and may be
renewed for no more than four years. They may not, however, be sold or
transferred.
The Department retains the right to withdraw the certificate of need if,
after public hearing, the Department determines that a certificate holder is
not making a good faith effort to meet the conditions specified in the certif-
icate. Certificate applicants or current holders who wish to transfer their
interests may appeal the Department's decisions to the District of Colum-
bia Board of Appeals and Review and, upon the exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies, may file suit in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
B. Elections
In 1980, the District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics issued
new rules governing District campaigns.4 Candidates now have ten days
(instead of five) after the candidacy is announced to designate a principal
campaign committee. The rules specify that candidates who run for more
than one office must designate a campaign committee for each office
sought. New procedures also govern notice to the Director of the Board
and Resources Development Act of 1974 provides federal loans and grants for the construc-
tion and improvement of institutional health care facilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300q, 300r (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). Each state seeking to apply for federal funding must establish a state
agency to perform specified regulatory functions, 42 U.S.C. § 300m (1976 & Supp. III 1979),
including the granting of certificates of need. 42 U.S.C. § 300m-2(a)(H)(B) (1976 & Supp.
III 1979). In accordance with the federal Act's provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 300m(b)(l) (1976 &
Supp. III 1979), the Department of Human Resources was designated as the agency in
charge of health planning and development in the District of Columbia. Mayor's Order 76-
59, 22 D.C. R. Reg. 4302 (1976).
14. 27 D.C. R. Reg. 1510 (1980). The District of Columbia election laws governing the
financial disclosures of candidates are codified in D.C. CODE §§ 1-1133 to -1141 (Supp. V
1978 & Supp. VII 1980).
19811
Catholic University Law Review
upon a substantial change in the campaign committee's status. Notice
must be given within ten days after the committee ceases to accept contri-
butions or to make expenditures. The Board must also be notified within
ten days of a committee's dissolution.
The new rules also modified the statutory limitations on campaign con-
tributions. 5 While the maximum aggregate amount any person can con-
tribute to a single election remains a total of $4,000,16 "one election" was
defined by the new rules as the primary, general and specific election for
each office or any initiative, referendum or recall measure. The new rules
require the Director of the Board to examine and audit the statements of
every candidate and campaign committee after each election. Candidates
will be required to repay contributions that the Director determines exceed
statutory limits. Candidates may contest the Director's findings at a hear-
ing, but the Director's subsequent determination is final.
Mary Elizabeth Frederick
15. D.C. CODE §§ 1-1161 to -1162 (Supp. V 1978 & Supp. VII 1980).
16. D.C. CODE § 1-1161(c) (Supp. VII 1980).
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